Sep 21 2009
Christian Ethics
Harakas pp1-35; “The Professional Panhandling Plague”; Plato Republic Book II
In this first chapter of Harakas’s book, he attempts to outline an introduction to the study of Christian Ethics, looking at the two foundations of Theology and the theoria of Christian Ethics and how the praxis of Christian Ethics is to be built on these[1]. He also points out that to rigidly divide theology, theoria and praxis would be artificial: they are all bound up in the ecclesial life which embodies Christian ethics.[2]
Some of the key themes he covers which must always be kept in mind when considering specifically Christian ethics include
· the fact that the purpose of the ethical life is theosis[3] which implies an orientation towards the Trinitarian life (though it would be more accurate to say that the real purpose of life is Christ, theosis being an effect of moving towards that telos),
· that there is therefore an implicit call to the ethical life being formed in “patterned relationships”[4] and a central focus on a “love-ethic”,
· that when speaking of ‘freedom’ in Christian ethics, this is not equivalent in Orthodox use to self-determination (αυτεξουσιον) but to the ability to act in harmony with the divine will without conflict,
· that the Tradition of the Church has a normative character for the method of approaching ethics and ecclesial life (including but not limited to the sacramental life of the Church) is the context for living this out: where the transfigured life of the person is formed and developed in embodied relationships[5].
The extract from Plato’s Republic shows Socrates being asked to justify the goodness of justice. His pupils see three classes of good: those undesirable in themselves but desirable for their consequences (e.g. medicine); those desirable only in themselves (e.g. joy); and those desirable both in themselves and for their consequences (e.g. knowledge). They would like to think justice would be in the third class, but can see no reason for putting it anywhere but the first. Surely justice would be a good in itself, they say, and yet if someone were free of the consequences he would never choose to behave justly because it is always a disadvantage to himself.
In the fleshing-out of this idea, they describe two men: one who lives ‘perfectly’ unjustly and through indulging all his desires builds up for himself wealth, comfort and good repute, and another who lives perfectly justly and for his pains and self-sacrifice suffers poverty and the scorn of all. In this we can see the same pattern as that described in the book of Job, where the world does not reward the upright and godly life. This itself, of course, along with the ‘suffering servant’ of Isaiah, is a prefigurement of Christ himself.
“The Professional Panhandling Plague” describes how the charity of those who give to beggars is abused by “street people who have made panhandling their calling”, often giving misleading impressions of their personal situations, demanding money by aggressive means and sometimes building up to violent crime. There are many ethical questions that arise from this article, one of the more subtle being the question of whether it is permissible to manipulate laws designed for other purposes to deal with the problem of the beggars (banning motorists from giving “framing the legislation as safety ordinances”), along with more familiar questions such as what responsibility the giver bears for the way the money is used and whether giving encourages the less honest ‘career-beggar’ and even violent crime.
[1] He claims to be doing something different from St Paul and St John Chrysostom in that modern circumstances require an “enumeration” of ethics which was not previously necessary (p3). In fact, both St Paul and Chrysostom do “enumerate” practical points of life precisely because they were not necessarily clear (or at least not always followed) by their hearers. What could not be done (and still cannot be done) is to come up with some exhaustive list of right actions for all occasions.
[2] p25, though he does sometimes tend to imply a too-rigid distinction, for example “faith is to be applied to life” (p3) – surely faith is life for a Christian, not a theory or collection of doctrines that is “applied” to a life that has in some way been constructed without it. He does get close to making this point: "… Christian truth is not a compilation of ideas and concepts, but rather, a reality experienced in the Christian community which reflects the mystical life of the Holy Trinity" (p9).
[3] p6, though rather than theosis he prefers the weaker term “God-likeness”
[4] p12
[5] p18-19, 25
